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Introduction 
The question of whether we are currently in a ‘New Cold War’ or not has been widely debated by the media, politicians, and within the academ-
ic field, and as such remains a pertinent issue worthy of exploration. Interactions between the US and Russia over recent years have highlighted 
some clear tensions within the strained relationship, and the Ukrainian crisis has certainly not helped in dispelling the cold war narrative propa-
gated by a new brigade of cold warriors. This perspective, held by authors such as Edward Lucas (2014), views the Russian state as embarking on 
a quest to regain the power and prestige that the Soviet Union formally held, and perceives Moscow’s foreign policy to be inherently aggressive 
and an explicit challenge to the current world order. This research however seeks to counter the dominant viewpoint which places the two 
states within yet another conflictual framework, further perpetuating the destabilisation of their current relations. Instead a more nuanced anal-
ysis is presented which attempts to give credence to the ‘Cold Peace’ thesis outlined by Richard Sakwa (2013), whereby Putin does not seek to 
recreate an empire but merely alleviate its disenfranchised position in the contemporary state of affairs.  
Methodology 
The ‘Cold Peace’ argument is put forth utilizing the progressive insights of realism’s newest branch - neoclassical realism - which draws upon 
Kenneth Waltz’s ‘levels of analysis’ approach, shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The field of political psychology is also innovatively incorporated in the form of operational code analysis. Interpretations can be made about 
statesmen's philosophical and instrumental beliefs through close scrutiny of public speeches and interviews, as verbs are ‘considered to be a 
speaker’s linguistic representation of perceived power relationships’ (Walker, 1990: 407). The analysis of Presidents Obama and Putin’s 
speeches at the UN General Assembly in September 2015 is shown below. 
Third Image: System 
Polarity, Distribution of power/capabilities, Anarchy, Alliances 
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Economic system, Political culture, Regime type, Public opinion 
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Barack Obama’s 2015 UNGA 
Operational Code 
Vladimir Putin’s 2015 UNGA 
Operational Code 
Philosophical Indices Numerical Values 
    
Nature of the Political Universe +.29 
(somewhat friendly) 
Realization of Political Values +.14 
(somewhat optimistic) 
Predictability of Political Future .21 
(low) 
Control over Historical Develop-
ment 
.26 
(low) 
Role of Chance .95 
(very high) 
Instrumental Indices   
    
Strategic Approach to Goals +.36 
(somewhat cooperative) 
Tactical Pursuit of Goals +.24 
(somewhat cooperative) 
Risk Orientation .21 
(low) 
Timing of Action   
a. Cooperation/Conflict .64 
(high flexibility) 
b.    Words/Deeds .56 
(medium flexibility) 
Utility of Means   
Reward  .19 
(low) 
Promise .15 
(low) 
Appeal/Support .34 
(low) 
Oppose/Resist .23 
(low) 
Threaten .00 
(very low) 
Punish .09 
(very low) 
Philosophical Indices Numerical Values 
    
Nature of the Political Universe +.24 
(somewhat friendly) 
Realization of Political Values +.08 
(Mixed) 
Predictability of Political Future .24 
(low) 
Control over Historical Develop-
ment 
.17 
(low) 
Role of Chance .96 
(very high) 
Instrumental Indices   
    
Strategic Approach to Goals +.73 
(very cooperative) 
Tactical Pursuit of Goals +.32 
(somewhat cooperative) 
Risk Orientation .62 
(medium) 
Timing of Action   
     a. Cooperation/Conflict .27 
(low flexibility) 
 b.    Words/Deeds .37 
(low flexibility) 
Utility of Means   
Reward  .14 
(low) 
Promise .05 
(very low) 
Appeal/Support .68 
(high) 
Oppose/Resist .09 
(very low) 
Threaten .00 
(very low) 
Punish .05 
(very low) 
Conclusion 
 
This research finds that the current circumstances 
do not mirror the conditions existent during the 
Cold War, with asymmetries prevalent across all 
three images and within the economic, military and 
political spheres. Whilst Putin’s operational code 
supports the perception that Moscow’s intentions 
and motivations are often unclear, it is dangerous to 
frame recent interactions within the previous con-
frontational framework. Nevertheless, Western tri-
umphalism and ignorance of Russian concerns and 
interests have propelled us into a spiral model 
whereby the prevailing perception of Russian for-
eign policy assertiveness ignores the Kremlin’s un-
derlying persistent feeling of fear and insecurity.  
 
To avoid pushing Russia, and indeed other rising na-
tions, to the brink of explicitly wanting to challenge 
the current world order, the US and the West more 
broadly must read their foreign policy actions as a 
desire to be respected and afforded a leading role in 
the global system. 
